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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LL.M. in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University.  
The economic crisis of 2008 has led to global adversities of the international economic 
system. Consequently, adopting the economic crisis challenges, the European 
Commission introduced a new financial framework of supervision: the European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) in 2010. At the start of 2011, it has initiated 
three new supervisory authorities devoted to controlling the systemic risk and to 
securing more coordinated supervisory competences. This dissertation is related to 
both the supervision role, which is mirrored in the application of the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). 
Furthermore, the dissertation describes and evaluates the implications and 
peculiarities of these new institutional parties within the European Union by granting a 
crucial approach of their competences in opposite with the frame of the Member 
States competences, while pointing out basic outcomes that apply in various sectors. 
More specifically, it justifies that the ESAs have been initiated effectively, but an 
enhanced foundation is necessary, particularly stronger governance in the decision-
making in the supervisory stability throughout the European Union. This new regime 
constitutes obvious progress for the European Capital Markets, even though some 
political legal and practical shortcomings remain, in most of the case as a consequence 
of compromise among the Member States.  Basic aftermath is that the profits of 
legislative harmonization, achieved by Single Rulebook, will be eliminated without any 
orderly establishment and application. It is important these matters to be expressed 
via the continuous procedure of European Union. Lastly, the dissertation includes 
suggestions for improvements in ESAs’ efficiency. Undoubtedly, it will be a contest to 
find the common language between ESAs’ competences and these of national 
authorities.    
Keywords: ESFS, Financial supervision, Regulation, EBA, ESMA, EIOPA, ESRB. 
Maria Strongyli 
26/01/2020 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this dissertation is to examine the phenomenon of the global financial crisis 
that occurred in late 2007 – start of 2008 and to investigate the impact it had on the 
system of financial supervision as it has developed throughout the passage of years and 
was followed by the European Union.  It is a matter of great interest to understand how 
this new system operates in practice, especially since numerous assumptions surround it. 
As it is known, the new economic conditions affected the European capital markets law 
significantly; as a consequence, this reform focuses on financial integration and 
centralization, steps that might lead to future amendments by the financial supervision 
within the European Union. However, it is critical to examine the extent that this financial 
integration and centralization may take.1 
In September 2009, the European Commission proposed the replacement of the current 
supervision system by the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), which consists 
of three European Supervisory Authorities that are commonly referred to as ESAs: the 
European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and also the 
Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities, the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB)2 and the National Competent Authorities (NCAs). This new established 
system completely changes the existing European financial landscape. The key purposes of 
the new supervisory authorities, established in January 2011, were to reinforce the 
control of cross-border members, to improve the stability and the quality of supervision 
nationwide, to augment and obstruct the systemic risk to financial consistency within the 
                                               
1 Papadopoulos, T. (2014). European System of Financial Supervision. Wolfrum R. (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Oxford University Press. [online] SSRN. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638620 [Accessed 5 
October 2019] From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). Oxford University Press, 2013. All Rights 
Reserved. Subscriber: EPIL Gratis; date: 31 October 2014. 
2 European Parliament. (n.d.). European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) | Fact Sheets on the European Union | 
European Parliament. [online] Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/84/european-system-
of-financial-supervision-esfs- [Accessed 16 November 2019]. 
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European Union and implement a European common Rulebook ready to apply to all 
financial markets within the broader economic reality.3 
Personally speaking, I believe that the existence of the ESAs is vital, as they ensure control 
over the existing tasks and responsibilities of the European Banking Supervisors 
Committee. In contrast to their predecessors, the competent authorities are able to 
engage, to implement and to draft binding Regulatory Technical Standards.4 
In this dissertation, the European System of Financial Supervision will be firstly analyzed, 
especially in regards to its necessity, the possible further steps to reform, the relation of 
the old legal framework with the new one and the reasons that led to the creation of the 
ESAs after the economic crisis of 2008.5 Moreover, the legal framework of ESAs will be 
presented, as well as their supervisor and rule-making powers. Additionally, the European 
Systemic Risk Board will be referred, which is tasked with the macro-prudential 
supervision of the financial system within the European Union. Finally, the challenges 
facing ESAs and ESRB will be analyzed and critiqued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 Papadopoulos, T. (2014). European System of Financial Supervision. Wolfrum R. (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Oxford University Press. [online] SSRN. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638620 [Accessed 5 
October 2019] From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). Oxford University Press, 2013. All Rights 
Reserved. Subscriber: EPIL Gratis; date: 31 October 2014. 
4 Haentjens, M., Gioia-Carabellese, P. (2015). European Banking and Financial Law. New York Routledge. 
5 European Parliament. (n.d.). Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms 
in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council - A7-0478/2013. [online] Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?reference=A7-2013-0478&type=REPORT&language=EN&redirect 
[Accessed 23 November 2019]. 
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CHAPTER ONE: The European System of Financial Supervision 
This chapter examines the phenomenon of the 2008 global financial crisis illustrating the 
main reasons that contributed to the changes in the European System of Financial 
Supervision.  
Historical Reasons – Financial Crisis 
The 2008 economic crisis it is known as the worst financial recession the world economy 
has faced since the ‘Great depression of the 1930’s’.6 Within the European Zone since the 
emergence of the crisis, none of the financial institutions could guarantee 
creditworthiness and, as a result, the uncertainty surrounding the financial system was 
leading in random and less productive investments. The basic aftermath of this condition 
was that both banks and financial institutions were faced with a grave challenge of 
liquidity malfunctions. It was widely believed that the economies of the United States and 
the European Union would not be able to face and overpass such worldwide economic 
agitation.7 That belief had as its base the common perception that a strong economy, as 
they were being developed until that period, had its fundamentals to ongoing growth in 
exports or the success of production.    
In contrast with historical banking instabilities of the 19th and the early 20th centuries, the 
2007-2008 banking crisis was referred to panic. In the 19th century, the banking sector was 
characterized as insolvent as they could not satisfy the depositors' demands for cash. 
However, in 2007-2008 the involved financial institutions turned to other financial 
institutions by not increasing the repo margin (‘haircut’) and repurchasing agreements 
(‘repo’) or renewing the sales, resulting in the insolvency of the banking sector and in 
huge deleverage causing the shutdown of many markets, which had consequences in the 
economy at large.  
                                               
6 Dullien, S., Katte, D. J., Marquez, A. and Priewe, J. (2010) The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008–2009 and 
Developing Countries. New York: United Nations Conference On Trade And Development. 
Verick, S. and Islam, I. (2010). The great recession of 2008-2009: causes, consequences and policy responses. [pdf] 
Available at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp4934.pdf. IZA Discussion Paper, No. 4934. Bonn: IZA. 
7 LSE London. (2011). The economic recession - Why London escaped lightly. 
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The global economic crisis has its origins in the change of the banking sector, which 
includes two different changes, a huge need for guarantees, and the movement of big 
amount of loan assets to the capital market as securities by the banks. 
The Necessity and the Steps ahead to Reform 
The economic crisis of 2007 and 2008 revealed the problems of the financial supervision 
of the time, some of which resulted in delays to the process of financial globalization and 
the tightly interwoven European financial markets by the competent supervisory models. 
Notably, the financial crisis caused adversities in many sectors, including guidance, 
collaboration and the steady application of European Law. The European Parliament, prior 
and during the economic crisis, implemented requirements in order to set up the 
foundation for more thorough European supervision, where all the key agents, within the 
European Union, would participate in further harmonization of the financial markets.8 
In November 2008, Jacques de Larosière de Champfeu proposed ways to reinforce 
European financial supervision aiming to protect citizens and regain their trust. These 
impactful suggestions (‘de Larosière Report’) aimed to decisively reduce the chances of 
other potential financial recessions and strengthen the existing supervisory structure. 
They led to changes to the supervisory formation of the financial sector within the 
European Union and included the creation of the ESFS and the three ESAs, one for the 
banking sector (EBA), one for the securities sector (ESMA) and one for the insurance and 
occupational pensions sector (EIOPA), as well as the European Systemic Risk Council 
(ESRC).9 Also, in November 2014 the European Central Bank (ECB) was created as the 
institution, which is in charge of the supervision of banks in the Eurozone.10 
                                               
8 Papadopoulos, T. (2014). European System of Financial Supervision. Wolfrum R. (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Oxford University Press. [online] SSRN. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638620 [Accessed 5 
October 2019] From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). Oxford University Press, 2013. All Rights 
Reserved. Subscriber: EPIL Gratis; date: 31 October 2014. 
9 ibid 
10 Moloney, N. (2014). EU securities and financial markets regulation. 3rd Edition, Oxford European Union Law Library, 
Oxford University Press. 
European Parliament. (n.d.). European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) | Fact Sheets on the European Union | 
European Parliament. [online] Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/84/european-system-
of-financial-supervision-esfs- [Accessed 16 November 2019]. 
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The New Legal Framework and its Connection with the Old Regime 
The ESFS, created by legislation adopted in 2010, includes the EBA (EBA Regulation 
1093/2010), the ESMA (ESMA Regulation 1095/2010), the EIOPA (EIOPA Regulation 
1094/2010), the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (Articles 54–57 
EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations), the ESRB (ESRB Regulation 1092/2010) and the national 
competent authorities (NCAs) (Article 1 (2) EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations). European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) were established at the beginning of 2011.11 
The EBA, the ESMA, the EIOPA, and the ESRB should closely collaborate throughout the 
Joint Committee in order to find common ground regarding the supervision of financial 
issues and to guarantee cross-sectoral stability. These aforementioned authorities must 
be liable to the European Parliament and the Council. EBA, ESMA and EIOPA are liable for 
the supervision from micro-prudential perspective, while ESRB, cooperating with the ECB, 
conducts the macro-prudential supervision. A ‘hub-and-spoke' type was followed in 
relation to legislation. Whatever regards this type, ESAs (the ‘hub’) exercise and follow 
precise suggestions and regulations, and the competent authorities (the ‘spokes’) 
introduce them partially in their rule-making process and partially in their daily 
supervision.12 
The Council selected the city of Paris as the new seat of EBA, where ESMA’s one is, while 
the seat of EIOPA was selected to be located in Frankfurt. EBA’s seat was in London until 
November 2017. However, EBA was required to be relocated in Paris as an aftermath of 
the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union in March of 2019. Both Council and 
Commission agreed to the aforementioned relocation in order to ensure the steady 
operational process of EBA during Brexit.13 
The previous system had significant blind spots, like the lack of collaboration between 
authorities, leading to concerns regarding its efficiency. The ESFS has to constitute a 
                                               
11 Papadopoulos, T. (2014). European System of Financial Supervision. Wolfrum R. (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Oxford University Press. [online] SSRN. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638620 
[Accessed 5 October 2019] From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). Oxford University Press, 
2013. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: EPIL Gratis; date: 31 October 2014. 
12
 ibid 
13 European Parliament. (2019). Legislative train schedule | European Parliament. [online] Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-deeper-and-fairer-internal-market-with-a-strengthened-
industrial-base-financial-services/file-eba-relocation [Accessed 2 January 2020]. 
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unified system for both European and competent authorities, and their bodies should 
collaborate with reliance, specifically to secure all relevant and proper information is 
shared between them. Within the European Union, all rules and their methods of 
application need to be harmonized between the Member-States, in a coherent system, so 
that all financial market participators are under the same level of scrutiny.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
14
 Papadopoulos, T. (2014). European System of Financial Supervision. Wolfrum R. (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Oxford University Press. [online] SSRN. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638620 
[Accessed 5 October 2019] From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). Oxford University Press, 
2013. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: EPIL Gratis; date: 31 October 2014. 
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CHAPTER TWO: The Legal Framework of EBA, ESMA, EIOPA and NCAs 
This chapter presents the Legal Framework of EBA, ESMA, EIOPA and NCAs examining 
each of them both collectively and separately. The ESAs are European bodies with legal 
personality and have legal capacity granted to legal persons under the national law 
applicable in each case. They proceed in actions on behalf of the European Union, both 
autonomously and as members of the Board of Supervisors, the Board of Appeal, the 
Management Board, the Executive Director and their representative Chairperson. Neither 
the European institutions, nor Member-State, nor any other private or public member can 
have authority or influence over them.15  
Governance Structure 
ESAs’ representation consists of their Chairperson, who is responsible for the guidance 
and preparation of the discussions of the Board of Supervisors’ table, the Executive 
Director, who oversees the Authorities’ daily functional work and to prepare the 
Management Board meetings.16 
The ESAs’ governing bodies are: The Board of Supervisors (BoS) that makes the decisions 
of the Authorities and also the ESAs’ policy decisions such as the adoption of the draft of 
Technical Standards, Opinions, Guidelines and Reviews. The Resolution Committee 
(ResCo) undertook all the decisions for particular subjects related to resolution of financial 
institutions for the BoS; and the Management Board (MB) having as a role to secure that 
the Authorities perform their assigned tasks and generally follow their general mission. To 
do so, the MB enjoys the authority to make suggestions on the yearly budget, review, 
tasks’ program and the staff policy scheme.17 
                                               
15 Papadopoulos, T. (2014). European System of Financial Supervision. Wolfrum R. (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Oxford University Press. [online] SSRN. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638620 
[Accessed 5 October 2019] From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). Oxford University Press, 
2013. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: EPIL Gratis; date: 31 October 2014. 
16 European Banking Authority. (2013). [online] Available at: https://eba.europa.eu/about-us/organisation [Accessed 2 
January 2020]. 
European Securities and Markets Authority. (2019). [online] Available at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/about-
esma/governance [Accessed 2 January 2020]. 
Kamerling, J. (n.d.). The 2017 Review of the European Supervisory Authorities. [pdf] Available at: https://ebi-
europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Josina-Kamerling.pdf [Accessed 30 November 2019]. 
17 ibid 
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ESAs are, also, in co-operation with each other in the Joint Committee’s structure for 
cases of cross-sectoral coherence. Specifically, the Joint Committee is responsible for 
controlling and accounting, assessing risks and identifying weaknesses of the economic 
consistency, introducing means confronting money laundering and supervising financial 
institutions.18 
The Board of Appeal, ESAs’ joint entity, has been, also, established for the efficient 
protection of rights of bodies that have been impacted by ESAs’ decisions. Even though its 
secretariat is enhanced by the Authorities, which consist of the Board of Appeal, it is 
completely independent in the decision-making process.19 
Supervision 
The ESAs undertook all the assignments of the former European Supervisory Committees, 
3L3 Committees (CESR, CEBS, CEIOPS), however they have been assigned to enhanced 
liabilities underlining regulatory competences.20 
Parallel to the new ESFS, other competent authorities maintain their position to supervise 
the market day-to-day, while the functional supervision and imposition remain on them. 
Nevertheless, they in turn are supervised by ESAs, which can improve guidance among 
national authorities, particularly, when circumstances endanger the integrity and function 
of financial markets or the consistency of the financial system within the Union (Article 31 
EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations). In order to achieve the best possible results, ESAs conduct 
peer reviews upon the competent authorities’ activities. Therefore, these peer reviews are 
evaluated and compared based on techniques introduced by the ESAs, which take into 
                                               
18 European Banking Authority. (2013). [online] Available at: https://eba.europa.eu/about-us/organisation [Accessed 2 
January 2020]. 
European Parliament. (n.d.). European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) | Fact Sheets on the European Union | 
European Parliament. [online] Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/84/european-system-
of-financial-supervision-esfs- [Accessed 16 November 2019]. 
19 European Banking Authority. (2013). [online] Available at: https://eba.europa.eu/about-us/organisation [Accessed 2 
January 2020]. 
European Securities and Markets Authority. (2019). [online] Available at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/about-
esma/governance [Accessed 2 January 2020]. 
20 European Commission. (2013). Public consultation ESFS review. Background Document. 
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consideration any existing assessment and information (Article 30 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA 
Regulations).21 
There are two options of intervention under the new regime against competent 
authorities: The one includes ESAs’ decisions on disagreements and emergencies and the 
other one refers to potential breaches of European Union law by the competent 
authorities. Whether a national authority fails to comply sufficiently with European Union 
law in a corrective way, and having issued a relevant request from the national 
authorities, the Commission, the Council, the Banking Stakeholder Group or the European 
Parliament, and after relative information to the competent authorities, the ESAs should 
conduct investigations in order to identify violations of European Union law. Appropriate 
information should be provided by competent authorities to ESAs without delay. After the 
addressing of this report and no longer than two months, ESAs should proceed with 
further suggestions to the national authorities for the relevant actions to be taken in order 
to obey European Union law. During ten working days, after receiving the suggestions, the 
competent authority should update ESAs on the ongoing moves it would take to 
guarantee compliance with European Union law. However, in case that the competent 
authorities are not compliant with European Union law, and during the one month period 
from receiving ESAs’ suggestions, ESAs should inform the Commission and the latter 
should introduce an official opinion, based on ESAs’ suggestions, for the national authority 
to ensure its compliance with European Union law (Article 17 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA 
Regulations).22 
Furthermore, the new system ensures the contingency of ESAs to interfere directly against 
the market agents. ESAs can take any individual decision for any financial institution and 
require of them to proceed to action in order to be compliant with its directions under 
European Union law, containing the suspension of any practice, and without the 
prejudgment Commission’s authority (Article 258 Treaty on the Functioning of the 
                                               
21 Papadopoulos, T. (2014). European System of Financial Supervision. Wolfrum R. (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Oxford University Press. [online] SSRN. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638620 
[Accessed 5 October 2019] From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). Oxford University Press, 
2013. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: EPIL Gratis; date: 31 October 2014. 
22 ibid 
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European Union (TFEU)), where a national authority is not compliant with the 
Commissions’ formal recommendations or when it is required to guarantee the 
competition within the market.23 
In cases of emergency, ESAs can automatically intervene in order to settle potential 
disagreements among the national authorities. For this power to be put into effect, a basic 
requirement is that a competent authority is not compliant with ESAs’ orders.24 
When a problem arises in a scale that may put at risk either the good function or the 
consistency of the financial system of the European Union or the integrity of its financial 
market, ESAs can immediately act, and, where appropriate, give directions to the national 
authorities. The ESRB, the Commission, in co-operation with the Council, and, where 
necessary, the ESAs, should introduce a suggestion directed to the ESAs, specifying that an 
emergency condition exists. If the Council follows this suggestion, ESAs should take the 
appropriate single decisions and force competent authorities to proceed with 
improvements for emergency conditions making sure that competent authorities and 
financial institutions are complying with the requests of this Regulation (Article 18 
EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations).25 
Additionally, ESAs have the competence to directly intervene and supervise market 
participants. The ESAs can also set an alarm in conditions that an economic activity might 
jeopardize the efficiency and consistency of the financial system, within the European 
Union and its citizens too. Particularly, ESAs can provisionally limit or forbid certain 
economic activities, which could endanger the integrity and steady function of financial 
system in European Union.26 
ESAs have the capability to interfere and settle down the disagreements among 
competent authorities in cross-border conditions. In case that the competent authorities 
do not accord with the activity of competent authority of some Member State, ESAs 
                                               
23 Papadopoulos, T. (2014). European System of Financial Supervision. Wolfrum R. (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Oxford University Press. [online] SSRN. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638620 
[Accessed 5 October 2019] From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). Oxford University Press, 
2013. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: EPIL Gratis; date: 31 October 2014. 
24 ibid 
25 ibid 
26 ibid 
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should take the lead and give co-ordinations in order to resolve any potential 
disagreement. Accompanied with that, ESAs’ responsibility is to determine the time 
limitation for conciliation among competent authorities taking into consideration the 
urgency and complexity of the matter. When agreement cannot be reached, the ESAs 
intervene with binding decisions aimed to resolve the issue in accordance with European 
Union laws. In case that a competent authority disregards such a decision, then the 
relevant ESA can use its powers to intervene in actions of market participants. Therefore, 
the relevant ESA can force any financial institution to be compliant with its requirements 
under European Union law and proceed to appropriate actions, in case that the financial 
institution shows unwillingness to do so. This decision is over any previous decision that 
might have been adopted by some other responsible authority for the same matter 
(Article 19 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations).27 
Decisions taken by ESAs, which regard Articles 17, 18 and 19 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA 
Regulations can be easily challenged by any legal or natural person before the Board of 
Appeal, which decides within two months from the filing of the appeal. It proceeds in its 
decisions independently, however it constitutes a joint party of the ESAs. According to 
Article 263 TFEU, all the processes should be initiated before ECJ, when a decision should 
be adopted by the Board of Appeal or in situations where the appeal cannot be launched 
before the Board of Appeal from ESAs.28 
Rule-making Powers 
The ESAs, in the process of Lamfalussy, have to substitute the Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors and the Committee of European Securities Regulators and to reconsider all of 
their authorities and objectives. Undoubtedly, there are differences between the old and 
new one regime. In the old version, on the level 1 process, the European Commission took 
the place of old Committees in order to provide consultation on the technical elements of 
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rules and policies. On the level 2 regulations, the Committees were called by the European 
Commission for the submission of their advice, which were introduced after detailed 
deliberation with the Committee. The new regime keeps this advisory role, nevertheless 
this role converts in obligatory and from technical point of view ESAs position is getting 
stronger during the legislative process. Furthermore, it is important to be mentioned that 
these propositions remain obligatory only in situations that they rigorously declare in the 
level 1 process.29 
The ESAs must have an independent role in the process of advising the Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament in their jurisdiction’s areas and in preparing new 
regulation. The ESAs, also, have the ability to introduce suggestions and guidelines to 
participators of financial markets or competent authorities according to Article 16 
EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations. These suggestions and guidelines have significant role on 
the process of implementation of European Regulations and Directives to ensure stable 
application of European Union law, even though they are not binding. The mechanism of 
‘comply or explain’ stems from Article 16 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations and both 
participants of financial markets and competent authorities must follow these suggestions 
and guidelines; if they choose not to, the relevant competent authority needs to provide 
explanatory reasons to the ESAs.30 
Issuing of implementing and regulatory technical standards is a crucial rule-making 
competence of the ESAs. The regulatory technical standards (RTS), which have to be 
followed by the decisions or legislations, lay down to Article 10 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA 
Regulations. Additionally, Article 290 TFEU consists of a set of acts and denotes that any 
legislative act can represent to the Commission the capability to follow any potential non-
legislative act in order to substitute or alter specific insignificant segments of the 
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legislative act. ESAs have to register their standards’ suggestions to the Commission for 
validation, while the content of regulatory technical standards must be bound by these 
acts and must be completely independent of policy and strategic decisions. Then, the 
Commission must make the decision to accept or not the draft of regulatory technical 
standards in three months. It also has the option to accept the suggested rules either 
partially or by proceeding to some amendments according to European Union’s interests. 
If the Commission does not proceed with the validation of the aforementioned draft, it 
has to return it to ESAs with related justification.31 
The ESAs can proceed with alteration on the draft regulatory technical standard based on 
the Commission’s amended proposals, to resend it copied in a formal way both to the 
Council and European Parliament within six weeks. In case ESAs fail to process this in time, 
then the Commission can either adopt the amended regulatory technical standard or 
decline it. Also, there is a chance that the Commission may not proceed by altering the 
content of the proposed regulatory technical standard before the collaboration with ESAs. 
In cases that ESAs do not present a draft regulatory technical standard to the Commission 
in timely manner, the Commission can follow a regulatory technical standard through 
devolved activity without any draft issued by ESAs.32 
There is the chance that potential objections to regulatory technical standards may occur. 
The Council and the European Parliament can provide their objections to regulatory 
technical standards in the period of three months starting from the date when the 
Commission accepted them. There is, also, the chance of alteration or non-validation of 
draft regulatory technical standards. In case the Commission does not proceed with the 
endorsement of the draft regulatory technical standards or alterations, the Commission 
must update ESAs, the Council and the European Parliament quoting its justifications. 
Moreover, where is considered necessary, the Council or the European Parliament has to 
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invite for a briefing-session both Chairperson of the specific ESA and the Commissioner in 
order to justify its objections.33 
Article 15 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations explains the process behind the adoption of 
implementing technical standards (ITS). ESAs can develop them by introducing acts based 
on Article 291 TFEU and the European Union securities legislation. Article 291 (2) TFEU 
describes that if there is a need for implementation of legally mandatory European Union 
acts, these acts can insert related implementing competences on the Council or the 
Commission. The implementing technical standards can be followed by relevant decisions 
or legislation, independent of policy options and strategic decisions. Furthermore, these 
standards must be technical and define the terms of application.34 
The specific ESA should present the draft, where there are implementing technical 
standards, to the Commission for validation. In three months from the time of their 
receipt, the Commission should take the decision either to validate them or not. The 
Commission also has the ability to extend the aforementioned period to one more month 
and validate implementing technical standards either partially or with alterations, in case 
the European Union needs request them. If there is an intention that the Commission 
proceed with partial validation or with alterations, it has to explain its decision back to the 
relevant ESA. The specific ESA can alter the draft with implementing technical standards 
according to the Commission’s suggested alteration and resend it back to the Commission 
in six weeks in official form.  A copy of this official format must be sent both to the Council 
and the European Parliament. In case that this six weeks period is passed and the specific 
ESA neither has altered the draft with implementing technical standards as the 
Commission requires, nor have even sent them, the Commission can accept the 
aforementioned technical standards altered or reject them based on what it will consider 
the best. Moreover, the Commission has no right to modify the body of the suggestion of 
the implementing technical standards, without the ESA’s directions. In case that the 
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relevant ESA has not sent the draft with implementing technical standards, within the 
requested time boundaries, then the Commission can require it to be submitted in new 
ones’. Only in cases that ESAs have not submitted any draft with implementing technical 
standards, the Commission can follow implementing technical standards without the 
existence of a draft coming from the specific ESA but only with an implementing act. Both 
the Council and the Parliament cannot withdraw or object any implementing technical 
standard, however they can proceed with these practices concerning the regulatory 
technical standards. This is a major distinction between the proceeding of the 
establishment of the implementing technical standards and the one of the establishment 
of the regulatory technical standards.35 
The introduction of ESFS was accompanied with the introduction of Omnibus I Directive 
altering the sectoral regulation of financial services in order to secure the efficiency of 
ESFS (Directive 2010/78/EU)36 through amendments of the current financial services 
Directives, followed by the accurate aim of them to practice the suggested new 
authorities. Such changes can be divided as follows: Firstly, there is a review of the 
denotation of the relevant points where ESAs are capable of introducing technical 
standards as a method in addition to supervisory convergence having in mind the 
potential improvement of the Single Rulebook. Secondly, there is a reference, ESAs to 
arrange disagreements among the competent authorities in that way in order to achieve 
the appropriate balance, but only in cases where the sectoral regulation is enclosed in the 
rule-making procedure. In the third category, there is a discussion where alterations are 
needed for the proper function of the Directive, to secure the data sharing.37 
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The Single Rulebook 
The Single Rulebook looks to introduce a system of rules, which all European Union’s 
institutions must follow. The idea of the Single Rulebook was fabricated in 2009 by the 
Council having as objective to make a reference to the aim of integrated legislative 
framework for the economic field, which would constitute the common market within 
financial services. This will secure consistency in the application of Basel III, the regulatory 
framework for banks, within all Member States and will cover all the gaps of legislation 
contributing to better Single Market’s operation.38 
The regulation of European banking commenced from Directives, which caused critical 
declination in national laws. That created confusion contributing to regulatory instability 
and various contradicting interpretations, causing adversities in companies’ function 
within the Single Market, allowing institutions to take advantage of legislative gaps and 
manipulating the competition.39 
Furthermore, the economic crisis illustrated that in the unified financial markets, these 
declinations can imply disaster impact. From the time dangers produced due to the 
absence of harmonization, the effect can be extended throughout the Single Market and 
not only to be included in national borders.40 
It is also important to utilize the same calculation's techniques of the main necessities 
such as liquidity and capital ratios standards and the exact terminology of regulatory 
compounds.41 
The Single Rulebook has as an objective to cover these weaknesses in order to create a 
more clear, effective and flexible Banking sector within the European Union. Firstly, for a 
clearer European Banking sector: A Single Rulebook secures that condition of financial 
situation is more comparable and transparent throughout European Union for investors, 
deposit holder and supervisors. The economic crisis revealed that regulatory 
requirements’ opacity in different Member States was the main reason of financial 
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disequilibrium. Secondly, for a more effective European Banking sector: A Single Rulebook 
shall secure that all institutions must not be compliant with the 28 different orders of 
rules. Finally, for a more flexible European Banking sector: A Single Rulebook secures that 
all relevant conservations are followed within the European Union, and not confined to 
the single Member States since the financial turbulence illustrated to which level the 
economies of Member States were correlated.42 
The new legislative framework has to be established in this form in order the national 
resilience to be avoided in the macro-prudential methods’ activation, since the financial 
cycles and credits are not coordinated throughout the European Union, even though a 
Single Rulebook constitutes the key for the European Union.43 
Therefore, Member States have maintained some capabilities in order to demand their 
institutions to keep more capital. For instance, Member States will maintain the capability 
to place greater capital standards for lending in real estate sector, which standards should 
also be applicable to businesses from other Member States that operate in that Member 
State. Furthermore, any Member State has the task to provide protection to its financial 
sector from external threats that can jeopardize the economic consistency. Moreover, 
Member States would maintain their existing competences under ‘pillar2’, for instance, 
the possibility to introduce further demands on a particular financial institution following 
the procedure of supervisory review.44 
European Banking Authority (EBA) 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) constitutes an independent European Union 
Authority responsible for the stability and efficiency of supervision and prudential 
legislation throughout the banking sector in Europe.45 Its targets are the guaranteed 
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integrity and the preservation of financial consistency within the European Union and the 
successful operation and effectiveness of the banking sector.46 
EBA’s basic objective is to assist in the establishment of the European Single Rulebook in 
the banking sector, whose target is related to the introduction of a single set of well-
established prudential regulations for the financial institutions across the European Union. 
EBA, also, has a crucial role in the implementation of supervisory acts and it is mandatory 
to provide an evaluation of the weaknesses and threats of banking sector of the European 
Union.47 
The EBA was created on the 1st of January 2011 as a body of the European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS) and undertaking all the assignments and liabilities of the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors. Its delegation is the building of a single 
supervisory and regulatory structure for the whole banking sector across the European 
Union, in order to guarantee a consistent, clear and effective Single Market, which is 
useful to businesses, to consumers and to the wider economy within the European 
Union.48 
In addition, EBA is responsible for the potential vulnerabilities within the European 
banking sector and the assessment of the risk that might occur through European Union 
wide stress tests.49 
Missions and Tasks 
EBA’s basic objective is its influence to the introduction of Guidelines and Binding 
Technical Standards (BTS) in order to establish a European Single Rulebook in banking 
sector.50 
                                               
46
 European Banking Authority. (2013). [online] Available at: https://eba.europa.eu/about-us/eba-at-a-glance [Accessed 
2 January 2020]. 
47 ibid 
48 ibid 
49 European Parliament. (2019). Legislative train schedule | European Parliament. [online] Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-deeper-and-fairer-internal-market-with-a-strengthened-
industrial-base-financial-services/file-eba-relocation [Accessed 2 January 2020]. 
50 European Banking Authority. (2013). [online] Available at: https://eba.europa.eu/about-us/missions-and-tasks 
[Accessed 2 January 2020]. 
   
 -19- 
Furthermore, EBA has a critical role in the convergence of supervision acts in order to 
guarantee that prudential rules will be orderly followed. Moreover, it is mandatory that 
EBA evaluate the weaknesses and threats throughout the European banking sector via 
stress tests and steady assessments.51 
Other assignments, that EBA is responsible for, include: The decision-making expressed to 
financial institutions or to national authorities in emergency conditions; the research of 
alleged inefficient or mistaken application of European Union law by the competent 
authorities; its action as an individual advisory part to the Commission, the Council and 
the European Parliament; mediation in order to settle different perspectives among the 
national authorities in cross-border cases; a predominant role in the adoption of justice, 
simplicity and clarity for services throughout the inner market.52 
In order EBA to implement the aforementioned assignments, it can introduce a number of 
non-legislative or legislative texts, which contain Recommendations, Guidelines, Binding 
Technical Standards, Opinions and ordinal reviews.53 
The Binding Technical Standards constitute legislative acts that determine specific 
elements of European Union regulatory text (Regulation or Directive) and intend to secure 
steady harmonization in particular sectors. EBA introduces draft BTS that are eventually 
followed and validated by the Commission. The BTS are straight applicable and legally 
mandatory to all Member States, which does not happen with Recommendations or 
Guidelines.54 
EBA's Role in Stress Testing  
One of the rules of the EBA is to supervise and evaluate market developments and to 
recognize possible risk, norms and weaknesses arising from the micro-prudential 
dimension.55 
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One of the main supervisory techniques to proceed with such examination is the 
European Union broad stress test practice. The EBA Regulation grants to the EBA 
competences to originate and guide the European Union broad stress tests, in 
collaboration with the ESRB. The objective of this kind of test is to evaluate the flexibility 
of economic institutions in potential adverse conditions of market and also to provide 
assistance to the general evaluation of systemic threat within the European Union 
economic system.56 
The EBA’s broad stress tests of European Union are executed in bottom-up method, 
utilizing stable methods, frameworks and hypothesis initiated in collaboration with, the 
ECB, the ESRB and the Commission.57 
EBA's Role in the Single Rulebook 
The EBA has a dominant role of Single Rulebook’s creation in banking sector. It is binding 
that EBA introduce a high volume of Binding Technical Standards (BTS) for implementation 
of Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD), Banking Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD) and Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) set. BTS represent 
legislative acts, which constitute specific elements of a European Union legislative text 
(Regulation or Directive), targeting to secure steady coordination in particular fields. BTS 
can be followed by the Commission via legislative texts and then they can be immediately 
applied and legally mandatory within all Member States. Therefore, from the day that 
their force starts, their establishment into national law is forbidden since they constitute 
part of Member States’ national law. Furthermore, EBA can provide, where necessary, a 
report on the application of all BTS, which have been followed by the Commission as well 
as on the recommended alterations, as part of its participation to an integrated 
supervisory method throughout European Union.58 
Moreover, EBA provides directions to the Single Rulebook Q&A procedure. Via this 
procedure, EBA is responsible to reply to queries issued by stakeholders upon the practical 
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introduction of DGSD, BRRD and the CRD IV set, containing guidelines and technical 
standards as part of the Directives and Regulations.59 
EU Agency 
EBA represents one, among others, specialized European Union agencies that have been 
established by the Council and the European Parliament in order to undergo particular 
technical, scientific or legal functions and is a critical element of the European Union.60 
The above agencies work in co-operation with Member States and European Union 
institutions, providing them trust-worthy based recommendations to assist in formation of 
updated rules and procedures at national and European Union level. They also contribute 
to the exchange of valuable data within the European Union.61 
Peer Reviews 
The Review Panel of EBA was developed in order to introduce a methodological approach 
for peer reviews carrying out them regularly. These peer reviews require comparison and 
evaluation of the efficiency of the supervision acts and the provisions’ execution by 
national authorities. According to Article 30 EBA Regulation, the Review Panel of EBA will 
regularly arrange and undertake peer reviews of national authorities’ acts, to enhance 
surveillance stability.62 
The peer review will contain an evaluation of the sufficiency of the governance 
settlements and assets of the national authorities mainly in cases concerning the 
application of implementing and regulatory technical standards; the best practices 
launched by the national authorities; and the level of convergence achieved between 
supervision acts and the application of the EU regulation.63 
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Whatever regards its tasks, the Review Panel of EBA undertakes reviews exclusively based 
on self-evaluation introduced by national authorities in relation with objective and 
transparent harmonization criteria. The trustworthiness and efficiency of this practice are 
secured by the procedure’s clarity, by the transparent practices, the knowledge and 
experience and by the autonomy and objectivity of the Review Panel Community’s 
members and of its Chair.64 
EBA conceived the decision to set up the Review Panel on 4th May 2011, but the Board of 
Supervisors of EBA accepted its method for the peer review system in June 2012. This 
agreement establishes the necessity of the Review Panel, describes the Review Panel 
member’s designated processes and outlines the area of the peer reviews. The method 
marks assistance and processes for the conduct of peer reviews and self-evaluation as well 
as for publication demands.65 
Supervisory Disclosure 
Supervisory disclosure illustrates a completed outline of legislative and supervisory acts in 
order to grant direct access to data concerning the regulations, laws, administrative rules 
and generic coordination followed by the Member States in the sector of prudential 
surveillance and regulation and to provide important information of the techniques 
followed by the national authorities across the Member States.66 
The content of this disclosure is divided in four areas: 
Rules and coordination; 
Options and national discretions: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, on prudential claims for 
financial institutions67, and Directive 2013/36/EU, on access to the practices and the 
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prudential supervision of financial institutions68, include set of national discretions and 
options that may apply in national conditions.  This part may facilitate individuals to 
proceed in important comparisons on how the aforementioned national discretions and 
options are applied into the single Member States.69 
Supervisory review: the generic standards and methods applied by competent authorities 
in the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), the minimum demands for the 
Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) executed by the financial 
institutions, and the procedures that coordinate competent supervisory authorities in 
proceeding supervisory measures regarding the particular institutions.70 
Consolidated Statistical data: the supervisory disclosure presents consolidated statistical 
information on key factors of the establishment of the prudential structure among the 
Member States. This disclosure comprises national statistical data on the banking sector, 
on the market, credit and functional risk, and on the supervision measures and acts.71 
Supervisory Colleges 
The main point to enhance the supervision of transnational banking bodies is the 
improved collaboration among ESAs and NCAs. Supervisory colleges constitute the means 
via which supervision acts are directed. The European Union law visualizes the 
implementation of supervisory colleges for banks of Eurozone with subsidiaries or 
important branches in other European countries and these banks can also have 
supervisors in non-European countries.72 
The predecessor of EBA, CEBS, introduced co-ordinations on common evaluation of the 
principles followed by the assessment procedure and by the supervision review, on the 
well-operation of colleges and on common decisions on assets sufficiency of transnational 
banking parties in college setting, in order to contribute to the progress of efficient and 
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steady college scheme. After the establishment of the updated Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), the guidelines will be 
substituted by the relevant technical standards including common decision on particular 
prudential demands, well-operation of colleges and information sharing among host and 
home supervisors related to institutions that function via branches.73 
The system of colleges illustrates the supervised bodies’ acts. Smaller ones contain two 
authorities, while other consist of 20 or more authorities coming from all around the 
world. There might be a difference in the frequency of college acts, which depends on the 
complexness and the extent of the institutions.74 
Because of the set up of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), supervisory colleges 
shall have a dominant role in banks with existence in non-SSM countries and the role of 
EBA will be considered more important. One bank will be under SSM authorities’ liability, 
if only functions in SSM countries and is considered as ‘domestic’.75 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) constitutes an independent 
European Union Authority that helps in securing the consistency of the EU economic 
system by strengthening the safety of investors and advancing consistent financial 
markets. It accomplishes this by evaluating threats to markets, investors and economic 
consistency, encouraging supervisory convergence, enhancing a Single Rulebook for 
European Union economic market and directly controlling the trade repositories and the 
credit rating agencies.76 
Legal Status 
There are some doubts regarding the legal framework of ESMA. Article 5 ESMA Regulation 
defines it as ‘Union body with legal personality’ however it is called ‘Authority’. Its 
formation is narrowly connected to the European Union ‘agencies’, which impose 
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authorities arising from the Commission. Adversities with ESMA’s legal position have two 
aftermaths regarding its efficiency as supervisor. Firstly, doubtfulness regarding its 
flexibility can impact ESMA’s approach on supervision. Secondly, ESMA has many of the 
elements connected with European Union agencies and the Meroni’s theory. These 
elements and their associations for legislative securitization may obstruct ESMA’s 
efficiency as a supervisor.77 
Scope and Objectives 
ESMA’s goal is the conservation of general interest by participating in the consistency and 
efficiency of the European Union economic system. For this reason, it contributes to a 
number of specific actions: ameliorating the inner market’s operation, containing an 
efficient and stable status of supervision and legislation; securing the coherence, 
effectiveness, clarity and well-function of the economic market; enhancing cross-border 
supervisory guidance; advancing equivalent competition’s situations and obstructing 
arbitration; securing the well-regulation and well-supervision of investments and threats 
and strengthening consumer’s safety. It is granted to a set of relevant competences that 
can be sorted as functional, supervisory and quasi-rule-making competences and which 
aforementioned set illustrates its competences and assignments precisely.78 
In exerting its competences, ESMA should function according to its limitations and it is 
authorized to operate according to the legal acts, and all regulatory measures rested on 
those acts; it is also empowered to operate in the area of market participators’ acts with 
respect to subject that does not directly belong under those rules, containing controlling 
and economic reporting, since those acts are important to secure the efficiency and 
steady application of these actions.79 
ESMA controls these financial market participators, which are not intended for the 
national authorities’ controls; provisionally forbids or limits specific types of economic 
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acts, in which the financial markets’ integrity and well-operation or the economic system’s 
consistency is in danger; enhances cross-border institutions’ decisions; and controls them 
in case they cause threats in the system.80 The aim of evaluating these threats to markets 
investors and the economic consistency is to identify rising threats, norms and 
weaknesses and if it is feasible, occasionally to take preventative measures. ESMA exploits 
its exceptional powers in order to spot potential market conditions that can put in danger 
the economic consistency, the well-operation of financial markets and the investors’ 
safety.81 
Rule-making 
ESMA’s key point of mission is its contribution to the introduction of a Single Rulebook for 
the financial markets of the European Union. Consequently, the aim of implementing a 
Single Rulebook for economic markets is to strengthen the Single Market by developing a 
fair operating ground for both producers and investors throughout the European Union. 
ESMA participates in enhancing the level of quality of the Single Rulebook for the all the 
European Union economic markets by drafting Technical Standards and by furnishing 
guidance to European Union institutions for projects related to the legislation.82 
Within Article 8 ESMA Regulation its responsibilities are enclosed. ESMA has been 
assigned to a number of quasi-rule-making operations. Although this quasi-rule-making is 
coalescent with many of ESMA’s assignments, it is narrowly related with the duty to 
contribute in the introduction of high-level unified regulatory and supervision standards, 
particularly by sharing suggestions with European Union institutions and by introducing 
recommendations, guidelines and issuing BTS; with the duty of evaluating and controlling 
market developments and running financial analysis of the market; as well as enhancing 
investors’ safety. ESMA’s concerned competences, which, regarding the quasi-rule-
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making, describe the authority to draft recommendations and guidelines and as well as 
BTS.83 
Similar to CESR, the predecessor of ESMA, it cannot follow, autonomously, laws and from 
the beginning has developed a set of soft-law techniques for itself in order to form the 
legislative environment more broadly and without the restrictions that are set by the rule-
making proceeding. However, ESMA has also carried many of the adversities faced during 
the CESR period, especially regarding the legality of its soft-law acts and is impacted by the 
adversities coming from its agency condition. This happens in situations regarding the 
Commission’s capability to refuse ESMA’s suggested BTS and recommendations, doubting 
ESMA’s independence.84 
Supervision 
Concerning the supervision, the connection between NCAs and ESMA can be considered 
as hierarchic, since ESMA has the capability to instruct decision on NCAs, to interfere in 
competent markets in outstanding conditions, and to set its supervisory directions to 
‘comply or explain’ mechanism. From the other side, ESMA belongs to the similar status 
with NCAs as ‘peer supervisor’, but with distinct liability for specific market participants. 
ESMA time to time initiates and implements peer reviews on most of the practices of 
NCAs in order to enhance more the stability in supervisory results. The aforementioned 
peer review processes, which recognize and enclose well-operations, may be more 
efficient in enhancing supervisory acts and European Union stability. Moreover, ESMA 
directs international relationships, guides NCAs activity, evolves and exchanges 
intelligence and best methods and supervises the system in general.85 
Also, there are some other set of levels to ESMA’s supervision operation. Firstly, ESMA 
works on the CESR’s tasks by participating in a series of cross-border guidance acts, with 
respect to the support of economic consistency.86 
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Secondly, it is authorized to operate as a direct supervisor. Via ESMA, the European Union 
has the ability to strengthen NCAs obedience to European Union law (Article 17 ESMA 
Regulation), to give guidance in crisis conditions (Article 18), and resolutions in NCAs’ 
stalemate with mandatory mediation (Article 19). ESMA has also been empowered with 
unique and direct specific-area supervision competences over two bodies with 
widespread range, trade repositories and rating agencies. ESMA can also impose its direct 
supervision competences over economic market participators, in cases such as NCAs 
might breach the European Union law (Article 17), urgent conditions (Article 18) and in 
cases that ESMA is authorized to intervene among NCAs (Article 19).87 
Thirdly, ESMA is authorized to enhance supervision convergence, by forming daily regional 
supervision by NCAs. ESMA is introducing a stable method to surveillance, beyond and 
further the management and guidance of host, home and cross-border threats, and it is in 
capable of exercising excessive functional processes by NCAs.88 
Finally, ESMA has been granted to a set of competences and responsibilities connected to 
economic consistency via macro-prudential system supervision and restriction of systemic 
risk and also connected to collaboration with the ESRB. ESMA has been delegated with the 
responsibility of controlling the systemic risk and confront any threat of interruption in 
financial services that is provoked by malfunctions of the economic system, and has 
possible damages within the market and generally to the economy. ESMA in co-operation 
with the ESRB, introduce a similar method to recognize and manage the systemic risk, 
containing both qualitative and quantitative indicators. ESMA, in order to regularly 
collaborate with the ESRB, must take into consideration the ESRB warnings and 
recommendations in the execution of its assignments. Furthermore, ESMA is responsible 
to supervise and evaluate the market growth and, if it is necessary, update the ESRB, the 
other ESAs, the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission about possible 
threats and weaknesses.89 
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Direct Supervision: Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories 
The ESMA Regulation does not refer to daily ESMA’s direct supervision over specific 
market sections. These authorities are indirectly expressed by Article 8(1) (j) that demands 
ESMA to complete particular assignments defined in the Regulation or other regulatory 
acts. So far, ESMA has been charged with sole direct functional supervisory authorities, 
over two institutions: Trade Repositories and Credit Rating Agencies.90 
ESMA’s liabilities can be considered as the tasks of direct supervision and enrolment of 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in order to ensure that the latter are complying with the 
CRA Regulation.91 The Credit Rating Agency system assigns surveillance authorities on 
ESMA and sets a functional standard where ESMA reserves single functional competences 
but can also request NCAs to perform a series of supervision roles, and which describes 
the NCAs relevant tasks in reinforcement of ESMA. The CRA Regulation established a 
single approach to the CRAs Supervision and Regulation across the European Union. This 
template was created to strengthen the powers of credit rating acts to secure high 
standards of ratings and investors’ safety.92 
The success of this process can be reached through supervisory practices by ESMA such as 
demanding the appropriate information, investigating and analyzing documents. ESMA 
can proceed with surveillance measures in case of violation in the CRA Regulation, 
depending on which level the breach is.93 
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Finally, this approach has been also developed for the assignment of sole supervision, 
registration and executive competences on ESMA regarding Trade Repositories (TRs).94 
Supervisory Convergence 
ESMA’s aim is to secure a stable surveillance method to ensure investors’ safety, the well-
operation of economic markets and the financial consistency. Supervisory Convergence is 
an ESMA’s priority for 2016-2020. ESMA contributes in the initiation of a common 
surveillance attitude among NCAs to implement effective and stable supervision, across 
the European Union, which is called supervisory convergence. To accomplish this task, 
ESMA prioritizes its yearly convergence via its relevant Programme known as Supervisory 
Convergence Work Programme, exploiting a set of techniques, as introducing co-
ordinations and advices, encouraging close communication among NCAs and ESAs 
throughout the European Union, proceeding in peer reviews to evaluate competent 
supervisory acts, mediation among national authorities and acting on violation of 
European Union Law. Therefore, ESMA fosters a stable and efficient introduction and 
execution of the same methods and rules throughout the 28 Member States. The general 
objective is to make an effort for supervisory and regulatory results.95 
Additionally, supervisory convergence denotes the exchange of top methods and the 
accomplishment of positive outcomes for the economy and the NCAs, which operation is 
executed in collaboration with NCAs, and constitutes a dominant aftermath of the 
introduction and execution of the Single Rulebook.96 The endeavors for enhanced 
supervisory convergence are useful for both economic market participators and 
supervisors. The technique in order this to be accomplished is the assignment of liabilities 
among NCAs or to ESMA. The aim of this delegation is to promote collaboration, avoid the 
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duplication in supervisory duties, organize and improve the supervisory procedure and 
decrease the charges applied to financial market participators.97 
Mediation 
In conditions where NCAs do not agree with each other in cross-border level, ESMA can 
contribute in the arrangement of their disagreements, if this is included in the European 
Union Law, via the process of Article 19 ESMA Regulation with which ESMA helps the 
related NCAs in achieving an arrangement of agreement for all parties; if this cannot be 
achieved, ESMA may follow a mandatory decision to arrange the situation; or via non-
mandatory mediation according to the procedure of Article 31 ESMA Regulation.98 
More specifically, on the one side, ESMA has the authority to introduce legally mandatory 
decisions for the arrangement of cross-border disagreements among NCAs, requesting an 
NCA to proceed or not to a particular action for the settlement of the issue. ESMA can 
proceed in actions either by NCA’s requirement or by itself. The arrangement can be 
achieved by joint decision of the NCAs during the conciliation stage or if they cannot end 
up in settlement of the matter, and by mandatory resolution arisen by ESMA on the 
relevant NCAs. On the other side, in conditions of dispute among NCAs, ESMA, by itself or 
after the relevant NCA’s requirement, can proceed in actions to implement an 
arrangement of agreement via non-mandatory mediation.99 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) was introduced as a 
result of the reforms to the supervision’s structure within the European Union’s economic 
sector. Prior and during the economic crisis in 2007 and 2008, the European Parliament 
suggested proceeding for a unified European supervision, in order to secure 
competitiveness among all the areas in the European Union level and to reflect the 
growing consolidation of economic market within the Union. As an aftermath, the 
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supervisory framework was to elaborate in order to minimize the potential threat of 
future economic crises. EIOPA constitutes one of the three European Supervisory 
Authorities and is the successor of CEIOPS.100 
Supervision and Regulation 
EIOPA assists in the establishment of high-level regulation and supervision within the 
European Union. EIOPA introduces a single rulebook for pensions and insurance within the 
European Union and is authorized to develop suggestions and co-ordinations, establish 
technical standards, issue regulatory and furnish recommendations to the European 
Union institutions for respective acts in European Union law. Also, EIOPA provides 
harmonization in supervisory procedures across the European Union. For these reasons, 
EIOPA utilizes tools such as peer review, work of supervisor’s colleges, seminars and 
trainings and the supervisory manual.101 
Insurance 
The target of EIOPA is to safeguard the public interest. EIOPA’s competencies comprise 
recommendations and developments in draft implementing and regulatory technical 
standards. Furthermore, EIOPA is authorized to share recommendations to the European 
Parliament, the European Commission and to the Council for insurance-wise.102 
Financial Stability 
For the securitization of economic stability, EIOPA monitors and evaluates norms, 
weaknesses and threats arising across sectors and borders in the field of its powers and 
from the micro-prudential level as well. Additionally, EIOPA proceeds in markets’ financial 
review and in the effects of market establishments informing, on regular basis, about its 
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research results the European Systemic Risk Board, others European Supervisory 
Authorities and the institutions of European Union.103 
The EIOPA’s philosophy to economic stability is to assemble the vulnerability and risk 
reviews in order to evaluate the consistency of the sector timely. For this work, EIOPA 
utilizes the followings: 
Financial Stability Report: twice a year, EIOPA executes an integrated financial review of 
vulnerabilities and risks experiencing the pension and insurance sector, in order to 
evaluate their economic stability. 
Risk Dashboard: its goal is to provide coordinated ideas to tackle the dangers of economic 
sector and to contribute with evaluation of these dangers and augment policies. 
Stress Tests: stress test functions for the pension and insurance sector must be performed 
on a regular basis and they have as an aim to evaluate the sturdiness of financial 
institutions and stiff growth conditions utilizing stable techniques throughout jurisdictions. 
Cooperation with the ESRB: through co-operation EIOPA is permitted to escalate 
insurance issues to ESRB and update about its progress, and at the same time to benefit 
by ESRB’s wide area of review in EIOPA’s own task.104 
Crisis Prevention 
EIOPA’s main task is the securitization of avoidance and management of crisis and the 
maintenance of economic consistency in crisis conditions, which can be divided into three 
categories: in the micro-prudential category, which concentrates on the dangers 
influencing individual institutions; the macro-prudential category, which aims to find the 
origins of systemic risk; and the internal category, describing procedures for EIOPA to 
perform well in crisis conditions.105 
The Regulation, that introduced EIOPA, assigns to it the following objectives, which 
constitute EIOPA’s philosophy to crisis avoidance and management: 
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Crisis prevention and management: In case of malfunction in progress, EIOPA has to 
accommodate and, if necessary, to guide the actions of competent authorities. 
Recovery and resolution: EIOPA should provide contribution and involvement in the 
growth and co-ordination of the efficient and steady recovery, procedures in emergency 
conditions and measures to reduce the systemic impact of any omittance. 
Macro-prudential policy in insurance: EIOPA must secure that it has progressive and 
continuous capability to act efficiently to potential systemic risks’ materialization, 
especially to institutions that might create systemic risk.106 
National Competent Authorities (NCAs) 
Despite the ESA’s introduction into the organization of European financial market 
surveillance, the latter is centered around the body of National Competent Authorities 
(NCAs). The ESFS must constitute a wide decentralized network where NCAs will maintain 
the duty of daily supervision and most of their responsibilities demonstrating both the 
effectiveness of decentralization and the most important complications of centralized 
supervision.107 
NCAs are liable for authorizing the actors of financial market, for continuous supervision, 
and, accordingly on local policy agreements, for enhancement. Whilst ESMA is 
investigating how NCAs impose their supervision, it, still, constitutes the basic local 
operation. The European Union regulatory structure, which rules the NCAs’ surveillance 
acts and competences, has, nevertheless, been focused on the results. The regulatory 
measures, that shape markets regulation and European Union securities, demand 
Member States to assign to NCAs to perform the relevant operations. Furthermore, they 
determine the supervisory competences the authorities are responsible for.108 
NCAs have the competence to: demand data from any individual associated with actions 
of alternative investments funds managers (AIFM) and, if needed, conduct investigations; 
have access to all the records; proceed with direct research, with or without any notice; 
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report criminal issues; request the termination of any action against the alternative 
investments funds managers directive (AIFMD)109; require the seizure of properties; 
demand the provisional forbiddance of professional actions; request from entitled 
controllers and AIFMD depositaries to give information; take any measure that secures 
that depositaries comply with the AIFMD’s requests; suspend manager’s or depositary’s 
potential given authorities and; demand controllers to conduct affirmations or 
examinations.110 
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CHAPTER THREE: The European Systemic Risk Board 
This chapter presents the functions of the European Systemic Risk Board. The basic 
meaning of systemic risk is described as the financial system’s risk with a possible negative 
impact on the economy and the internal market111. The European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) constitutes a collaborative group that consists of representatives of the ESAs, the 
European Commission and the national central banks. Under the European Systemic Risk 
Board’s responsibility lays the task of the European Union financial system’s macro-
prudential supervision, in cooperation with the ECB, for the mitigation or better 
prevention of possible systemic risks to economic consistency within the European Union. 
Also, its contribution provides a good function of the internal market resulting in 
securitization of sustainability of economic growth within the financial sector (Article 1(1) 
ESRB Regulation).112 
In contrast with ESAs, ESRB does not have supervisory and legally binding rule-making 
powers. Additionally, it must always co-operate with both the ESAs and NCAs. Whatever 
regards the ESRB’s targets, the ESRB undertook a number of objectives, including the 
control, identification and provision of recommendations and warnings related to risk 
(Article 3(2)). Therefore, in conditions where financial stability might be agitated by 
potential systemic risk, ESRB can introduce ex-ante warnings, where potential risk is 
considered to be critical, and recommendations and controls the on-goings to its 
recommendations and warnings. ESRB addresses classified warnings to the Council where 
it regards an ‘urgent condition’, in the scope of Article 18 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations. 
ESRB analyzes and gathers all the important information. Furthermore, ESRB must have 
close cooperation with authorities and provide them with all the relevant information 
upon the systemic risks for the execution of their objectives. ESRB can introduce a number 
                                               
111 Moloney, N. (2014). EU securities and financial markets regulation. 3rd Edition, Oxford European Union Law Library, 
Oxford University Press. 
112
 Papadopoulos, T. (2014). European System of Financial Supervision. Wolfrum R. (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Oxford University Press. [online] SSRN. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638620 
[Accessed 5 October 2019] From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). Oxford University Press, 
2013. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: EPIL Gratis; date: 31 October 2014. 
   
 -37- 
of qualitative and quantitative signs, a ‘risk dashboard’, for measurement and 
identification of the systemic risk, once again in close co-operation with authorities.113 
The ESRB has advisory character and is not engaged in ESAs’ rule-making activities and 
supervisory field. However, ESRB was created to affect and form regulatory, supervisory 
and fiscal rule-making. ESRB, in contrast to ESAs, is not independent. Nevertheless, ESRB 
applies objectivity requirements. ESRB’s members ought to perform their tasks objectively 
and in favor of the European Union.114 
ESRB Functions 
ESRB has two basic objectives: it is responsible for gathering and reviewing information 
(Article 15 ESRB Regulation) as well as for giving recommendations and warnings (Articles 
16–18). ESRB has to update the ESAs regarding information upon risks to succeed in their 
goals, when ESCB, the Commission, competent authorities and the ESAs have to 
collaborate with ESRB and supply it with all important information to accomplish its 
objectives. The ESRB is exclusively authorized to request information from both ESAs and 
other financial institutions if its requirements are not covered (Article 36(1), (2) 
EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations).115 
Main position in ESRB’s efficiency as control of macro-prudential risk is its competences to 
introduce recommendations and warnings (Articles 16–19) to the national and European 
Union authorities. In case that threats might emerge in the process of achievement of its 
targets, the ESRB must warn and if necessary introduce recommendations for preventive 
activities and recommendations for regulatory initiatives as well (Article 16(1)).116 
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Recommendations and warnings can be of particular or generic subject, and must be 
conveyed to the European Union itself or at least one or more Member States, the NCAs, 
or the ESAs. Furthermore, recommendations can be addressed to the Commission 
regarding European Union law (Article 16(2)). Recommendations and warnings to any 
receiver must be addressed to the Commission, the Council and the ESAs, if the receiver is 
a competent authority.117 
ESRB recommendations and warnings constitute soft law and are non-mandatory, but to 
which a process of ‘act or explain’ is applicable. Recommendations and warnings can be 
published after the decision of ESRB’s General Board as appropriate118. In case that, ESRB 
considers that a recommendation is not applied, or insufficient excuse is given, it has to 
update the Council and also the ESAs where necessary (Article 17(2)). Furthermore, ESAs 
are obliged to evaluate the implications of any recommendation or warning granted to it, 
to consider the appropriate action and to update the Council and ESRB on the reasons of 
non-followed actions (Article 36(4) EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations).119 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Implications of the New Financial Architecture 
This chapter aims to review the ESFS and to evaluate the problems the ESAs and ESRB may 
face. Article 81 of the EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations awards the Commission the right to 
issue reports on the operation of the ESFS, ESAs, and ESRB. The Commission published 
these reports in August 2014. Bearing in mind these reports and the public consultations, 
in September 2017 the Commission has proposed ways to strengthen the operation and 
organization of the ESFS in general. Therefore, this will allow more effective financial 
supervision within the European Union120 for further economic integration and complete 
capital market union in the scope of growth and investment across the European Union 
and stability of the monetary and economic union. Upon their approvals, the suggestions 
will enhance the funding of the ESAs, the governance and mandates, for financial markets 
and securities (ESMA) for banking (EBA) and pensions and insurance (EIOPA). To secure an 
integrated implementation of European Union law and prompt for real Capital Markets 
Union, the suggestions grant ESMA with competences for direct supervision in particular 
economic fields.121 
In September 2018 the suggestion was modified by the Commission publishing a 
“Communication on strengthening the Union framework for prudential and anti-money 
laundering supervision”, which proposes the centralization of anti-money laundering 
competences to EBA, reinforcing the anti-money laundering policy.122 
In March 2019 Member States and the European Parliament came on the conclusion on 
amending the supervision of financial markets in the European Union, making it stronger 
and more integrated. This conclusion strengthens the existence and role of the ESAs.123 
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Finally, in April 2019 the European Parliament approved the regulation concerning the 
organization of a capital markets union, as well as the assessment of the ESFS.124 
Assessment of ESAs Work 
The Commission introduced a review, as demanded under ESAs Regulations, with 
accompanying suggestions that illustrate the aftermaths of the new economic system. 
More particularly, it denotes that, generally, the ESAs have succeeded in their existing 
objectives since they have created well-functioning organizations. Nevertheless, there are 
some areas that still need to be developed to confront future challenges.125 
Generally, ESA’s supervisory competences constitute the biggest interest of stakeholders, 
who mainly did not concern for the challenging Articles 17–19 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA 
Regulations interference authorities, even though the Review encouraged the daily 
supervision to remain at NCAs level. There was not so much support for the assigned of 
additional direct competences in ESAs however there was expressed supportive action for 
ESMA to gain extra authorities connected with market abuse supervision and 
prospectuses.126 
The Review supported the idea for progressive reform in the sphere of ESFS’s institutional 
restructuring. Stakeholder perception was that ESAs supervisory stability work impacted 
less than its legal practices; the Report underlined, particularly, poor or non-use of peer 
reviews, intervention, and violation of European Union law competences.127 
Likewise, although the European Parliament understood that the ESFS has improved the 
stability and integrity of supervision, it requested some extra improvements. These 
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contained the enhancing of peer review, the specification in mandatory mediation and the 
supervision discretion, the improvement of Single Rulebook and generally, the 
introduction of defined ‘ESA approach’ and the undertaking of ESAs practices in favor of 
European Union’s interest.128  
Alongside the ESFS Review, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proceeded in precise 
evaluation of ESAs that mainly concentrated in surveillance. The IMF asked for enhancing 
of its peer review practices, defining the restrictions of the Articles 17–19 violations of 
European Union law and binding mediation competences, and of its capabilities to 
proceed in crisis prevention and in risk determination.129 
ESA’s self-evaluation mirrored the main subjects of the Review. It understood the 
necessity that granted to its Rulebook operations and to ESAs in order to strengthen its 
convergence of supervision actions. Thus, the legal practices have to be defined and 
followed in a relative and steady way and compliance has to be assessed in a regular 
manner. This goal is accomplished by European Union actions relating to the convergence 
of supervision.130 However, it also highlighted the adversities that its existing governance 
model creates where it is getting crucial to critique the surveillant exercises of the Board 
of Supervisors and recommended its organization to be reconsidered regarding its 
efficiency connected to supervisory convergence. Its official suggestions, nevertheless, 
were restricted to ESAs being introduced with a more powerful regulatory command and 
sufficient assets to enhance its capability to gather and share information with and from 
national authorities.131 
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More specifically, the target of the ESAs' actions is considered wide with the possibility for 
expansions in the area of investor and consumer safety, as well as in the banking sector. 
Therefore, the Commission should reconsider whether it is necessary to extend the 
existing powers of the ESAs in order to cover the aforementioned areas and make the 
ESAs more effective.132 
Concerning the regulatory role of ESAs, ESAs tasks taken over for the establishment of the 
Single Rulebook has led to crucial enforcement towards strengthened regulatory 
harmonization and stability. Therefore, the European Union assigned to itself a 
considerable number of high-quality rules in a reasonable time-manner. In order ESAs to 
dispose adequate time to prepare and submit high-quality draft technical standards to the 
Commission, there is a need for flexible deadlines. Furthermore, there is an absence of 
completed review on deliberations.133 
The ESAs has been established as European Union agencies and, hence, they contribute to 
the establishment of European Union procedures. Nevertheless, they are different from 
European Union institutions and their position in the regulatory procedure has to be 
evaluated in limits implemented by the Treaty.134 
Recommendations followed by the ESAs according to Article 16 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA 
Regulations are non-mandatory, but imply the ‘comply or explain’ aspect. These measures 
proved to be adaptable, however, there are some doubts concerning to their nature. This 
contradicts the Commission's perspective that the ESAs' competences should have a legal 
form.135 
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A suggested way to deal with that is to increase the clarity of the regulatory procedure. 
The ESAs should also draft legislative texts for draft technical standards, while the 
Commission should introduce more suitable deadlines.136 
Furthermore, the establishment of a single supervision network and practices constitutes 
a future aim, as the ESAs have granted priority to their regulatory role, a decision partially 
caused by their weaknesses to governance. Undoubtedly, the existing ESAs governance 
structure creates adversities in the management of disagreements between NCAs and 
ESAs and there is a potential threat that ESAs decisions are not in the same line with the 
European Union’s interests.137 
The ESA's privilege for access to national authorities' data could be utilized in a more 
efficient way. This was made even more apparent by the economic crisis, which exposed 
the insufficiency of the existing information sharing system between ESAs and NCAs, 
denoting the need for a more close cooperation between them. Thus, the ESAs have to be 
authorized to acquire data straight from market participators in particular cases and 
without using every other method of collecting data. This authorization can enhance the 
ESAs’ operation for the unhindered fulfillment of their objectives and strengthen the 
supervision.138 
The ESAs did not introduce suggestions, or obligatory decisions according to Articles 17–
19 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations, on urgent conditions, mandatory mediation, violation of 
law, however, they have used their moral offer and their non-mandatory mediation. The 
absence of binding mediation usage has been ascribed by the stakeholders to several 
reasons such as the ESAs’ governance body that is reluctant to proceed with actions or 
decisions against competent authorities, the preventing implications of the relevant 
competences, and the absence of transparency of the established Regulations in terms of 
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application and the activation of mandatory mediation. One way for further investigation 
is to define the field of application of the mandatory mediation.139 
The Commission also provides alterations to Article 17 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations 
regarding the violations of European Union law. In order the ESAs’ competences to 
identify violations of law to be efficient, it has been determined crucial that the ESAs have 
on their disposal all the related data. The alterations secure that in the cases of violation 
of European Union law inspections the ESAs will be in position to direct a reasonable 
request for data straight to related financial market participators, financial institutions or 
other national authorities. In this case, the national authorities have to be updated and 
accommodate the ESAs to gather the required data.140 
There are a number of ameliorations that could be taken over by the ESAs to confront 
uncertainties in this scope. Firstly, the ESAs must target to enhance the activity of 
supervisory convergence, via enhanced and necessary usage of peer reviews. Secondly, 
the Commission should investigate more choices in order to reconsider the uncertainties 
in the mediation competences.141 
Regarding the financial stability as well as the ESAs’ monitoring and coordination role, the 
ESAs undoubtedly play a critical role in the observation of the progress within the financial 
markets as well as in considering the sturdiness of financial institutions and economic 
system of the European Union in general. For this reason, ESAs have created different 
methods to accomplish their liabilities to recognize systemic risks. Until now, any urgent 
condition has not been reported, however, ESAs have taken preventative measures to 
efficiently act, if this is needed.142 
Furthermore, the ESAs have proceeded to different decisions in order to enable the 
information sharing and advance the coordinated movement. The most remarkable 
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examples consist of the Joint Committee review of risks, the ESMA’s measures guidance 
being followed by the national authorities and the EIOPA suggestion on the low-interest 
rates conditions. Most stakeholders are satisfied with ESAs’ guiding role.143 
Concerning the ESAs' structure, it seems suitable as it encourages the close cooperation 
between the micro- and the macro-prudential level, ESAs and ESRB respectively. In the 
need of structural alterations, like consolidating the powers into one seat or establishing a 
‘twin-peaks’ model, must be thoroughly evaluated considering the foundation of Banking 
Union.144 
Furthermore, it is wide-spread known that the direct supervision of CRAs by ESMA is 
considerably efficient. Therefore, an expansion of direct supervision to financial markets 
could be examined by the Commission.145 Such a potential expansion of ESMA’s 
competences can be assigned in market sectors, where it is crucial to enhance more 
unified, effective and well-operating financial markets’ means. Moreover, the 
aforementioned powers can be applied in fields where exceptional transnational action or 
harmonization implies wider threats for the financial consistency or in fields where 
integrated interpretations in the application of European Union rules are effective.146 
Challenges Facing ESAs 
The European System of Financial Supervisors visibly lacks the sufficient competences or 
the appropriate regulatory approach to perform its objectives and more specifically, the 
effective intervention powers to obstruct economic systemic risk even though this was 
described as a weakness in the economic field.147 
Whatever regards the legal effects, there are reconsiderations to ESAs’ new regulation, 
which regards the absence of imposed powers since the new regulation does not prohibit 
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the mandatory rules to be adjusted by the authorities. Nevertheless, it is vague the 
understanding of ‘binding’ terminology since it denotes imposed measures, but it does not 
mean that the authority should proceed with actions opposed to a competent authority.  
It is unfortunate that the cross-institutional organization and a lot of elements of 
European Union law have made more difficult the processes of the mandatory technical 
standards’ creation.148 
The struggle for the imposed competences between the national and European Union 
level has undoubtedly remained within the ESAs’ operation. ESAs’ influence to impose 
European Union supervision regulations on the European Union three-step-mechanism 
and assign instructions to financial institutions, can be considered hard. Furthermore, 
there is an argument the courts, which are independent, must agree with the violation of 
European Union supervision regulations of the competent authorities as the violation 
processes introduced by the Commission will be inapplicable and might be time-
consuming.149 
In urgent conditions, ESAs has the ability to demand for a national authority to be 
compliant with the European Union law and in particular occasions to assign, directly, 
orders to single economic market participators, in quicker way than the unwieldy 
procedure in conditions of breach of European Union law in accordance to Article 17 
EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations.150 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned competences demand a denotation of an emergency 
condition by the Council before any ESAs’ action that is important for an ESA to interpose. 
Also, there have to be non-conventional cases, where synchronized practices are required 
to act on stiff growth conditions that may put at risk the good operation and the financial 
institutions’ consistency. It is remarkable to view the way that ESAs utilize these 
competences whether an emergency condition will happen in the time beyond.151 
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Furthermore, the ESAs’ influence over urgent conditions is not that effective. ESAs, 
theoretically, would have influenced over the competent authorities in order to proceed 
in appropriate measures, whether the competent authority has not responded and that 
ESAs’ board has considered predominantly that an action should be undertaken for the 
Markets’ and institutions’ financial consistency. Nevertheless, the current regulation has 
the versa implications of conceding the Member States’ right for objection, with legal 
aftermath interrupting ESAs’ powers. This process, in crisis period, might be time-
consuming and can have critical impacts. For instance, ESMA’s privilege on the ultimate 
decision in urgent conditions is not all the time in accordance with the European Union 
law, as demonstrated in the Meroni Decision by the ECJ (Case 9/56). According to that 
decision, the institutions that are included in the TFEU may enjoy such competence upon 
them. Nevertheless, it is not clear if Meroni Decision, that impacted the subsidies’ 
promotion, might be applied to ESMA. Moving the privilege of last decision to the 
Commission, it can be contrary to the stated purpose to distinguish the external entities 
from the supervisory authority in order its independence to be secured.152 
One other doubt on Article 38 EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Regulations and the particularly 
safeguards of Member States, which article grants the latter with a ‘last resort’ power to 
prevent ESAs’ significant competences in the arrangement of different opinions between 
Member States and in urgent conditions. Even though the Member States might not refer 
to this anticipation regularly, its aftermath lies on the restriction upon ESAs’ competences. 
Nevertheless, it is important to state that the final decisions are adopted not by the single 
Member States but by the Council, although the Council should double-check its decision 
that secures coherence within European Union and prohibits single Member States to 
obstruct decisions.153 
Last, another criticism can be considered with reference to the absence of directions 
between the budget and the entities. This criticism is associated with the ESAs’ well 
function. Indeed, in consideration with other, the cooperation among ESAs is not 
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functional due to their geographical positions, located in two different European cities 
(Paris and Frankfurt).154 
Challenges Facing ESRB 
The main concern related to ESRB is its efficiency in those responsibility fields that exceed 
the information assessment and gathering. At first, ESRB confronts topics of legal 
certainty, which have correlation with the determination of its suggested operations’ legal 
validity. Article 114 TFEU that permits a body of authority to be covered by the law with 
liabilities for accommodating integrated establishment by the Member States and for 
participating in the coordination process, appears to be not practicable in this scenario. 
The terms of systemic risk and macro-prudential are not indicated in the current EU 
regulation, and this prohibits the association between the main body of integrated laws 
and the assignments granted to the ESRB.155 
In addition to this, the similar doubts, which concern the co-ordination, are applicable to 
the ESRB’s condition. The systemic risks efficient supervision demand data gathering and 
assessment both in macro-level of the economic system and in micro-level of the single 
financial system participators. ESRB must secure coherence between macro- and micro-
supervision, and this assignment relies on the data exchange method’s efficiency among 
ESFS. The ESRB’s reliance on other entities for the interpretation of its requests, warnings 
and recommendations for decisive actions denotes its success, or in other words, will 
inescapably be impacted by the aim of the authorities vested within these entities, the 
political press on them and also how they will utilize them. Finally, the ESRB’s reputation 
might be contested, since the ECB has introduced a steady draft of the systemic risk 
critiques that investigate the situation of the economic system and procure potential risks 
within a two-year-period.156 
The ESRB shall provide assistance to its role of European guidance and supervision, and its 
capability to introduce individual and public cautions and suggestions. Even though its 
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suggestions and cautions are non-mandatory, there is remarkable indirect enhancement. 
Nevertheless, to manage its targets the ESRB must obtain a reputation for effectiveness 
and reliability.157 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In January 2011, the Commission suggested the Omnibus II Directive (Directive 
2014/51/EU)158 as an aftermath of the introduction of the three new European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). The suggestion included decisive alterations in regulation 
and more specifically in the sectors of securities and insurance legislations in order to 
secure efficient function of ESAs. In essence, these suggestions established the right of 
ESAs to use their competences, containing the tasks of draft technical standards 
improvements and the resolution of disagreements among competent authorities. The 
objectives of this new regime can be considered critical since it aims to secure the stability 
of the financial market within the European Union.159 
The ESAs set their contribution to initiate integrated supervisory and regulatory standards 
through the reinforcement of recommendations and guidelines and issue implementing 
and regulatory technical standards. In addition to this, their enhancements include the 
steady application of common supervisory practice and legally mandatory European Union 
practices, securitization of efficient application of European Union legislations of 
securities, mediation and arrangement of different opinions among competent 
authorities, acting in urgent conditions and last, maintenance of the financial market 
participators’ efficient surveillance and the consistency in supervisory colleges’ 
operations.160 
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Nevertheless, there are doubts on the effectiveness of certain views of this new regime. 
Even though ESAs had been granted with potent rule-making competences, which can 
secure Rulebook efficiency to European Union securities legislation, potential difficulties 
might be arisen by the supervisory competences concerning the delimitation and 
effectiveness of competent authorities’ supervisory powers. From one side, the absence 
of centralization in supervision leads to reconsiderations due to the potential malfunction 
of the system, while from the other side, ESAs’ competences to direct and introduce 
decisions directly to market participators were doubted as well. These aforementioned 
powers reduce the capabilities of competent authorities and create issues on their 
functions.161 
Notwithstanding the adversities, the ESAs have successfully built well-functioned 
organizations. They have managed to fulfill their liabilities, even though confronting many 
requirements. Nevertheless, more developments are needed for the ESAs to completely 
benefit from their powers.162 
Undoubtedly, the capital markets law is remarkably impacted by the financial situations. 
Therefore, this new system must function in relation to the complexities and the special 
demands of the markets. This reform pursued the trend to the economic harmonization. 
Therefore, it can proceed in future alterations of economic supervision, within the 
European Union. Additionally, it is discussed that future alterations should extend ESAs’ 
rule-making competences. There are measures that should be applied in political scale, 
after thorough research of the experiences and the practical impacts, until now.163 
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